Under the heading: “From the President’s message to Parliament’s decision: the ruler is the strongest,” wrote Nicolas Nassif in the Al-Akhbar newspaper: Parliament never responded to the message to the President of the Republic that it addressed to him under paragraph 1. 10 art. 53, as he did yesterday: Whether the answer is an enforceable piece of legislation – which it most certainly is not – or an act of void that ultimately cuts the neck of criminal investigations.
In successive parliaments, under the Taif Agreement, they have so far received five letters from the presidents of the republic, but only the latter responded. Parliaments followed these rules on how to deal with each letter in accordance with the two mechanisms set out in Art. 53 of the Constitution and Art. 145 of Parliament’s internal system: adopt them, set a session date three days after receipt, discuss them and take a position or decision on them. The constitutional power vested in the President of the Republic is binding and obtainable. So it always ended before taking a position or decision. As the response to the message is the prerogative of the House of Representatives, in practice it depends on the reality of the blocs, their balance and their loyalty. Thus, experience from the first precedent showed a distinction between sending a message and taking a position or making a decision about it.
In the first three communications, the procedures were correct and they stopped being discussed without taking a position or a firm decision. She did not receive any response from the House of Representatives in such a clear and clear decision as Parliament yesterday. He did not respond to President Elias Hrawi’s message on March 19, 1998 when he called for the establishment of a National Commission for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism, coupled with the adoption of the optional Civil Status Act, which culminated in the conflict between him and Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. President Emile Lahoud’s May 4, 2005 message was not received, calling for a new electoral law to replace the law in force since 2000. At the height of the confrontation over the parliamentary elections scheduled for this year following Hariri’s assassination. To President Michel Suleiman’s letter of 21 May 2014, no reply was received just four days before the end of his term of office, urging Parliament to elect a successor before the constitutional deadline. The three letters traveled with the wind as if they were not there, not recited by the council, as if constitutional validity had no meaning. The President’s fourth message was addressed to President Michel Aoun on July 31, 2017, calling for an interpretation of Art. 95 of the constitution. The message reached the council and the date for its recitation was set for October 17, after which it was withdrawn and rejected due to the sensitivity of the content, leading to something like an interpretation of the constitution that did not arrive on time. Accordingly, Aoun was in the process of sending the message in December 2018. In the muck of a dilemma caused by the inability of Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri to form a government for seven months, to which he quickly turned a blind eye. However, writing was delayed until the following month. The last, fifth message to Parliament on November 24 is completely different from the previous one. It may be true that so far this has no equivalent. In the context of what this power is aimed at, which is contained in the reforms of the Taif Agreement, which is unprecedented in the 1926 Constitution, I added a quote from it from the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth French Republic that the President of the Republic directs it to Parliament in to settle a dispute between him and a procedural body in which he does not vote and is chaired when present. And who is bound by the binding deadline for signing its decision. When this cannot be accepted, he asks Parliament to intervene and settle the dispute, as long as the government is accountable to it for the regular work of constitutional institutions. The message has one more task, which takes on a special or exceptional character, justifying turning to the head of state, the legislature, the mother of constitutional institutions, who resorted to it with a dangerous right that threatens the unity of a country or its society, causes its division or disturbs it. institutions so that the parliament plays its role despite the president’s responsibility. Similarly mentioned in Art. 49 of the Constitution. Here, responsibility is shared in the face of sudden maturity, regardless of the risks. This is what the president’s four messages in 1998-2018 expressed.
As for what is happening today, it is unprecedented for the President of the Republic, as well as for the entire legislative branch:
1 – As originally requested by Aoun, and subsequently by Parliament, intervened to cooperate with the Government to enable the State to conduct forensic audits of the Bank of Lebanon’s accounts and from there at all public premises of the State. Which only means – which is a precedent – a “complaint” to Parliament from the president of Banque du Liban, Riad Salameh Al-Asi, regarding the execution of the decision of the trial body to transfer the confidential accounts of the Bank of Lebanon to the audit firm “Alvarez End Marsal”.
It happened that an employee, whoever he is, refuses to comply with a government decision, challenges an agreement he has made with an international auditing firm, and withheld evidence of wastage and financial engineering and heavy losses that have emptied his treasury and brought the colluding country to collapse with political class for four decades and floating banks. . Not to mention how many of those who have been granted loans and donations, which include non-adults in the political and power class, are not Lebanese. Not only is man responsible, but it was he who made the decision that led to the creation of the national currency. Thus, it abandons the first two conditions of the International Monetary Fund and the French initiative, and prevents the initiation of structural reforms based on the knowledge of the bankruptcy of the Lebanese state.
The worst thing about this “complaint” was the disclosure of the total impossibility of interrogating the ruler and forcing him to execute the executive’s decisions. But it is confirmation that it is the strongest in the system.
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